O Falcão Risohno reacted to falconsd56 in 2018 all over again
For like the millionth time.
We have the cap issues because the cap was lowered by 17 million.
This was the first year that the cap declined in who knows how long.
Had it been any other year then the cap would have gone up and we would have had to make minimal moves to get under.
O Falcão Risohno got a reaction from JohnnyFranchise in Poll...Who Would You Draft At Four?
I think Terry is doing a tremendous job with the minimalist moves in FA along with his ambiguous sound bites, but there's only so much GM speak I can buy. I don't think he will reach as hard as Dimitroff, but needs are real and BPA is not meant precisely. I'm still good with Sewell at 4, but I would fully embrace Pitts there too (with or without Julio).
O Falcão Risohno got a reaction from bigjmw84 in 2018 all over again
Hate to say it, but the Sacred Cow Syndrome surrounding Julio is part of what got us into this cap conundrum in the first place. We gave a grip and got more than reasonable rate of return, and we can still capitalize while his stock is still high enough!
O Falcão Risohno reacted to vel in Just figured why we need Pitts
You draft Pitts because of how rare he is. A 6'6 250lbs man who runs a 4.4 forty and the biggest wingspan ever for a pass catcher. How many defenders exist that can defend that?
If we didn't have Julio and Ridley, I wouldn't be as for Pitts. But it's their presence that I'm all for it. You have two WRs who require safety help, forcing two high defensive looks. With that, Pitts is being covered by a LB, a third safety, or a nickel corner. We saw what he did to teams best defenders at UF. Horn and Surtain covered Pitts in college. They will have to cover Julio/Ridley in the NFL. Pitts would be an oversized mismatch in a situation unlike any we've seen. It's like giving this offense Calvin Johnson. Literally.
O Falcão Risohno reacted to Sidecar Falcon in You can never have enough weapons; but you can have too few shields.
Anyone who has ever played a RPG video game knows what the term “glass cannon” means. For those who don’t; it’s basically a character build where you max out your attack stat at the sake of defense.
If we apply this to the game of football we can see how it can be applicable to our situation. Our offense was typically pretty good to great, however our defense has always been lacking.
Looking at the possible players we could select at 4th overall, we see consistently see 4 different position types (QB, WR, TE, OL). If we were to designate the specific players attached to these positions we would have the corresponding players mentioned; Fields/Lance, Chase, Pitts, and Sewell. Of those players, four would be considered weapons, while only one would be considered a shield.
Noticeably absent from these players is any sort of defensive position. Which isn’t unexpected; there are multiple players that are considered the BPA before any defensive position. Which may be a blessing in disguise.
The Falcons have been, what I consider, a “glass cannon”. We could put up the points, but we couldn’t stop them either. When our offense stuttered, our defense collapsed, and we lost despite the overwhelming winning probability in our favor.
Defensive players are being undervalued this draft. Mainly because they aren’t considered BPA; which is a relative term. With so many weapon type players accumulating towards the top of the draft; it would behoove us to attempt a few trade downs and select multiple defensive players.
Now I realize that it isn’t a guarantee that we can find trade back partners, but I feel it is doable. I know how seductive it can be to want to draft one of the weapon type players in the draft. However our defense needs a lot of work, and with so many talented defensive players in the draft that will drop, we could really make a massive impact in that area.
O Falcão Risohno reacted to falcons007 in With DQ Gone, I don't want to see this happening to any Falcons QB.
Falcons and Lions are the only teams with losing records in the last 3 seasons when the QB threw for more than 3 TD. To put this in perspective, GB had just 2 more games with QB throwing more than 3 TD compared to Falcons. However, GB had 7 more wins than Falcons.
W-L record when the QB throws 3 TD and one or less Interceptions:
Worst of all the Falcons have Pathetic record when the QB throws less than 2 TD. Chiefs had just 6 Games less than Falcons where the QB threw 2 TD or less, however they also had 17 less losses. It just shows the cards the QB in Atlanta has been dealt with every game for winning the game.
AS better get the Run game and the defense helping out the QB.
O Falcão Risohno reacted to Cole World in CROCKER REPORT: EUGENE HOLT’S 2021 SAFETY PROTOCOLS
CROCKER REPORT: EUGENE HOLT’S 2021 SAFETY PROTOCOLS
So what I was supposed to do, write some plain old safety rankings?
I tried, and it didn’t work. I can’t rank ten guys who will be deployed in different roles on the field. So buckle up boys and girls, I’m going to dig into this position. I’ll get into free safety, box safety, big nickel safety, dual-high safety, and everything in between. Let’s go!
FREE SAFETY/SINGLE HIGH
You can find your free/single high safeties mainly in a Cover-1 or Cover-3 type scheme. He is tasked with coverage of the deep half of the field. Basically a free/single high safety is responsible for anything going beyond 15 yards. Speed, smarts and ball skills are a must to be effective in this role.
ANDRE CISCO, SYRACUSE, 6’0″, 209 POUNDS
If speed and ball skills are what you want, look no further than Andre Cisco. Cisco is a true ball hawk on the back end. Cisco transitions perfectly into a single-high coverage safety at the next level. Below is just an example of the skills mentioned above: Cisco reads the quarterback and shows off his quick-reaction ball skills to pull in the errant pass.
TREVON MOEHRIG, TCU, 6’1″, 208 POUNDS
Trevon Moehrig is another player with the requisite range to play in a single-high capacity. Moehrig has worn many hats in coverage for TCU and excelled at all of them. I can see Trevon Moehrig having success in a Cover-1 or Cover-3 defensive scheme. Below you see Moehrig staying over top of the deep routes while the other safety takes the underneath route.
TYREE GILLESPIE, MISSOURI, 6’0″ 210 POUNDS
Playing a lot of single high already at Missouri, Tyree Gillespie’s transition to the next level is easy to project. One difference with Gillespie is that he brings a physical mentality along with his coverage ability. I can see Gillespie playing either the single- or dual-high safety look in the NFL. Below is an example of how Gillespie makes a statement when coming down in coverage.
The big nickel is a hybrid cornerback and linebacker, and is deployed in a base 4-2-5 defensive formation. With the usage of 12 personnel, big nickel packages put a bigger defender capable of covering a tight end on the field. They typically line up in the slot and cover whoever is there. That includes receivers, tight ends or running backs. It really is a unique position that requires a unique athlete. A big nickel defender has to be athletic enough to run with receivers as well as have the size and play strength to handle run fit responsibilities as well.
On the college level, big nickel is sometimes called the Star position. Minkah Fitzpatrick from Alabama and K’von Wallace from Clemson have manned this position in the past. At the pro level, New Orleans Saints defender Chauncey Gardner-Johnson plays a similar role. During the Eagles’ Super Bowl run in 2017 they deployed Malcolm Jenkins as a big nickel defender.
TARIQ THOMPSON, SDSU, 6’0″, 210 POUNDS
Tariq Thompson already comes with experience in a three-safety base defense. While at San Diego State he played in a base 3-3-5 defense. He typically covered in the slot. They called it the “Field Warrior” position. Below, you see Thompson has the short-area quickness and physicality to survive as a big nickel at the next level. San Jose State is in 11 personnel. SDSU is in Cover-2 with Thompson in the slot. Thompson does a nice job coming off his man and driving on the underneath route to make the tackle.
SHAUN WADE, OSU, 6’1″, 195 POUNDS
Shaun Wade saw his stock fall after spending the 2020 season as an outside cornerback. I believe Wade would have success as a big nickel/slot player. When you go and look into Shaun Wade on film you can see his best reps were in 2019 when he was a nickel defender. Below, you see Ohio State’s Cover-3 zones. Wade drops into his zone to cover any hook, curl, or flat routes. You see the quick click-and-close as well as the physicality to make a solid tackle, leading to a minimal gain for the offense.
JEVON HOLLAND, OREGON, 6’0″, 207 POUNDS
Jevon Holland can be successful in a variety of roles with his talent. I believe he’s an excellent scheme fit as a big nickel. The main reason is that I’ve seen him do it. Holland is a smart player with the athletic ability to cover the shallow zones. He’s also a very sure tackler in the run game. Here you see Auburn running a counter. Holland comes into the left. As soon as the running back thinks about bouncing outside, Holland is on him.
JOSHUA BLEDSOE, MISSOURI, 6’0″, 200 POUNDS
Joshua is one half of a very talented safety duo at Missouri. Above I mentioned Tyree Gillespie as a single high safety. In the slot is where Bledsoe can have an impact. Bledsoe has good awareness in zone coverage and isn’t shy about meeting a ball carrier with violence. Below you see Missouri in Cover-1 man. Bledsoe takes on the task of covering Florida receiver Kadarius Toney. Bledsoe stays disciplined and physical at the top of the route stem. Ultimately, Bledsoe stays in phase.
BOX SAFETY/STRONG SAFETY
The box safety and linebacker positions have become somewhat synonymous in today’s NFL. You typically see the box safety or strong safety in Cover-1/Cover-3 defensive formations. In these formations the safety is essentially another linebacker. He can drop into a shallow zone and cover hook-to-curl routes as well as be a force defender against the run.
The benefit of having a box safety really shows against the run. With an extra defender in the box, offenses are at a numbers disadvantage when trying to get the blocking scheme set. The box safety can line up just outside the stacked formation where he won’t have to worry about gap responsibility. Basically, he’s free to see the ball, get the ball in the run game. For the creative and aggressive defensive coordinators, the box safety is a tremendous weapon in blitz packages as well.
HAMSAH NASIRILDEEN, FSU, 6’3″, 213 POUNDS
Hamsah Nasirildeen projects nicely as a box safety at the next level because of his quick diagnosis and strength. At 6-foot-3 and close to 220 pounds, Hamsah is an imposing figure in the box. At the same time, Nasirildeen offers the coverage ability to take away some of these mismatched tight ends. Below is an example of Hamsah’s play strength. Boise State wants to run outside zone. The running back cuts it back and Hamsah (bottom right corner) is right there waiting for him. The two things that stand out to me are eye discipline and patience; second is the strength to separate man from the ball.
DIVINE DEABLO, VIRGINIA TECH, 6’3″, 226 POUNDS
First and foremost, wherever Divine Deablo gets drafted, he certainly has a first-round name. Deablo has the size of a linebacker and the speed of a safety, and can be seen doing his best work close to the line of scrimmage. He’s a force in attacking the run and offers coverage ability against opposing tight ends.
Two plays here: First is an example of Deablo’s ability in space. Virginia Tech is playing a Cover-3. The slot cornerback blitzes, and Deablo drops in a zone, covering hook-to-flat. He covers the slot receiver then quickly transitions to seek and destroy mode when the ball carrier comes his way.
The second is Deablo playing up in the box. He shoots the gap and attacks the ball carrier.
Cover-2 man, Cover-2 zone, Tampa 2: these are all defensive schemes that employ two high safeties. Dual-high safeties basically split the field in half, drop into a zone and keep the ball from going over their heads. There are different variations of Cover-2. In a zone concept, the entire defense plays off. In man, only the safeties drop into a zone. In Tampa 2, the Mike linebacker is required to drop into deep middle coverage. All can be effective in the right situation.
JAMES WIGGINS AND DARRICK FORREST, CINCINNATI, BOTH 6’0″, 200 POUNDS
I wanted to highlight these two players because they play together. They often display the benefits of playing dual high safeties. With both players being similar in height-weight-speed, they can easily roll coverage when offensive players go in motion. See the graphic below.
Teams tend to check to the run once they see dual high safety coverage. To counter that, teams disguise coverage. Here, with the alignment of Forrest and Wiggins, Cincinnati is showing a pre-snap Cover-3, and post-snap you see the safeties drop into Cover-2. This takes away a look the quarterback thought he had and he is forced to check down.
RICHIE GRANT, UCF, 6’0″ 194 POUNDS
Last but certainly not least, Richie Grant could have been a fit in a number of these categories. Grant has the awareness and versatility to work in tandem and seamlessly transfer coverage responsibility. Below you see an example of the range that Grant has. The quarterback makes the mistake of staring down his receiver and Grant is all over it.
Instead of rankings, projecting scheme fit is much more fun and informative.
O Falcão Risohno reacted to Sidecar Falcon in Elite OLs should be prioritized over elite WRs in 2021 NFL Draft.
^ This. I think we could trade back and still get Sewell.
Extra Picks & Sewell > Any pick at 4
O Falcão Risohno reacted to Romfal in Elite OLs should be prioritized over elite WRs in 2021 NFL Draft.
why is McGary not moving from OT? Go read some scouting reports, some scouts projected him inside when he was coming out. If he works out great, if not I have no problem moving on, he is not a draft selection of the current regime and should not be treated as a sacred cow just because he was picked in the 1st.
O Falcão Risohno got a reaction from celtiksage in Poll...Who Would You Draft At Four?
Run this poll back! Curious to see how it's shifted, and imagine it being heavily in favor of Pitts now. Would be shocked Sewell still leads, and frankly I think he would be surprised too. Maybe I'm way off, but I don't get the impression Penei thinks he goes as early as 4. (your dose of DLed @ 2:22-3:22)
O Falcão Risohno reacted to Mister pudding in Safety Scraps
I think we need to snag at least one more safety in free agency prior to the draft. These are the safeties listed in the top 100 free agents except for Kazee that have not yet been signed. Any thoughts on your preference? Or just wait until the draft?Bang for the potential buck, I'm leaning toward Duron Harmon aka "The Closer." Talk about ball awareness and on-field intelligence. Watch this clip my friends.
Xavier Woods, Malik Hooker, Tre Boston, Duron Harmon, Kenny Vaccaro, Karl Joseph, Tashaun Gipson, Damarious Randall
O Falcão Risohno reacted to Mescalito in Falcons sign S Duron Harmon and Multi-tool WR/KR/RB Cordarrelle Patterson
I love how Fontenot is quietly plugging holes to where we aren't overwhelmed with needs going into the draft. It would be nice to truly have a BPA approach in the draft and not feel kinda guilty about it.
O Falcão Risohno reacted to Francis York Morgan in Ito Smith Released
It's a business, thank you for your service, blahblah hope you do well on another team.
Glad they're trimming the fat. Only saves ~400k but it shows they're probably looking at RBs in the draft. Not happy with JAGs who bring nothing special to the table (even availability) anymore.
O Falcão Risohno reacted to Artys Arryn in Favorite 3rd Rd RB Prospect
Glad I'm not the only person around who sees it with Javian. My eyes tell me he's special. He's lower on Williams than I am by a good bit but I think he may be underrating Williams' speed a little.
Overall, I respect Simms for saying what he thinks and backing it up with reasonable takes.
Only time will tell but y'all get ready for me to be leading the Hawkins Hype Train if we pick him up. I been here for months lol.
O Falcão Risohno reacted to Sidecar Falcon in More Than 50% Of First Round Picks Are Busts And Other Terrifying Draft Statistics
A couple of years ago, I wrote about how difficult it was to actually hit on draft picks – at the time the hit rate I came up with was 53% for first rounders. Now, with a couple more years of game time for players to regress to their respective means (both positively and negatively), and with a little bit more time to delve a bit deeper into the data, it seems like a good time to revisit the data.
If you thought 53% was a low number, it didn’t get any easier.
Methodology and Rationale
As there is no objective method of determining a successful NFL draft pick, I shall once again be using PFR’s Approximate Value stat to determine success. This is, of course, far from perfect – AV essentially looks to incorporate a mixture of raw statistical production and playing time. A more thorough analysis would require an alternative quantitative assessment – or would be purely qualitative – but in the absence of a universally accepted player value stat, this is what we have to work with.
In this analysis, I will set two different standards, and explore how many players meet these two different levels. The first standard is that of an average AV per year of five or higher. This isn’t exactly a super high bar – any player who has been a regular starter over their career should reach this level – but this is going to be used simply to measure the bust rate, i.e. the number of players who can be seen as clear failures.
For instance, last season both Bruce Irvin and Eric Reid had an AV of five – both were regular starters, but neither were Pro Bowlers.
The other standard I am going to employ is that of an AV-per-year of seven or more – this correlates more to being a good NFL starter and so this is going to be used to judge the number of successful NFL draft picks, rather than just those who aren’t bad. Of course, this is especially relevant to players selected higher in the first round, where the expectation should be higher.
In their rookie seasons, DJ Moore had an AV of eight while Brian Burns had a four – the large difference in playing time and usage probably being the culprit.
The data below is grouped in several different ways, by position, by year and by pick number. There are likely to be clear variations between years due to the varying quality of draft classes – and there should be a general decrease in success rate with draft picks if teams are even vaguely effective at evaluating talent. The variation with position should, however, provide some insight into how effectively teams are able to take positional value into account, though as there are far more picks at some positions than others, the data on position groups with fewer first round selections is going to be more prone to individual team errors.
I will once again be looking at data on players drafted between 2011 and 2017 – the same as in the last study – but will also compare this with data from the past two drafts, though here, the limited playing time is likely to lead to a higher level of error – see Brian Burns, above, who wouldn’t be classified as a bust after one season, certainly. But if he were to play 43% of the snaps the next three seasons, that classification might change…..
Results and Interpretation
First, let’s look at how the base success rate varies with position and draft years – in this table, the data given is the percentage of players selected in the first round reaching an AV/year of five or more, as discussed in detail on the previous page:
There are several takeaways from this (it is also worth looking at the larger trends rather than focusing on the data from a given year). The first of these largely confirms the data collected two years ago, that while some years are better than others – 2013 isn’t looking any better as time goes on – the success rate broadly fluctuates around 50%, with no year doing better than 55%. It is also worth noting that that the number from two years ago of 53% has dropped slightly to 49%, suggesting that over time the number of players who regress is more than the players who make marked improvements over time.
The other takeaway from this is that the bust rate is much higher for some positions than others.
Interestingly, the positions that are being devalued somewhat by the analytics movement – namely, offensive line and running back – have some of the lowest bust rates, though this could also be due to the teams only being willing to draft players at these positions if they think they are in the very upper echelons.
This is particularly true for the interior offensive line and running back where the overall number of players drafted was notably low. The high success rate for offensive tackles, by contrast, is very interesting.
On the other side of things, there are also some positions where teams have been notably unsuccessful. Tight ends have been a complete nightmare for NFL teams, with every single tight end drafted in the first round between 2011-2017 thus far failing to live up to this standard.
The other positions where NFL teams have really struggled are receiver and defensive back, positions where teams place some of the most importance on athletic measurables – this doesn’t mean that teams shouldn’t draft receivers and defensive backs in the first round, but rather that teams should be more selective about which prospects at these positions merit such a high draft status.
It is also worth looking at these two factors when it comes to the upper tier (AV/year of 7 or more) of draft prospects – remember, these are percentages:
First, and almost inherently, these numbers are much lower than for the first table, which only measures whether a draft pick is a ‘bust’ or not. 2013 is, once again, the worst season – but again, the numbers are all in a vague grouping, with numbers fluctuating around 30% with no year having a rate of 40% or more. Interestingly here, the most effective position is quarterback, suggesting that while the hit rate isn’t that high, when teams do hit, the value is such that they immediately jump into the upper category – likely because first-round quarterbacks are given the chance to play quickly. Whether or not they’re successful in that early play time isn’t so easily measured by AV.
It is also worth noting that guard, a position that has a very low miss rate, also has one of the lower hit rates when it comes to the upper tiers. In other words, very few first round guards bust, but very few are huge successes either. Once again, offensive tackle and running back are also some of the best positions from a value standpoint, and defensive back and tight end are the least reliable positions groups.
The other thing that is worth considering is how this changes in terms of position in the first round – here’s those with AVs of five or above:
Here, there is one clear and somewhat reassuring trend, namely that the hit rate tends to broadly decrease as the draft goes on (at least for the first round). What is also noteworthy is how quickly the regression happens, with the rate being far higher for top five picks than even picks between six and ten. Some of this might be due to teams giving more playing time to those drafted in the top five whereas those drafted even five picks later don’t get shown the same level of patience.
Here’s those with AVs above seven:
Again, this upper standard shows the same decrease, though it is worth noting that the final six picks of the first round show an upwards bump in both cases. This could either be due to the fact that teams who are competing late in the playoffs show some correlation with teams who are good at drafting, but also that teams trading back into the back end of the first round do so with specific prospects in mind and will tend to do so with a lower risk tolerance than for picks in general.
The data for the last two drafts shows some interesting similarities and discrepancies with the older data. First, the lower hit rate threshold is much, much higher, reaching over 70% for both the 2018 and 2019 drafts. Some of this is likely going to be down to players not yet having time to regress to the mean, which is supported by the fact that the upper hit rates, while on the higher end, are far more in line with the rest of the data set.
This is somewhat supported by the extremely high hit rate for quarterbacks, as while players like Sam Darnold, Josh Allen and Baker Mayfield have all hit the threshold their first couple of years, it is unlikely that all three remain as high-level starters.
However, on the whole, the numbers are broadly in line with the original data set, suggesting that some of the improvement is due to teams moving away from drafting lower-success positions such as wide receiver and defensive backs in favor of offensive tackles and linebackers, which have a much higher success rate.
It will take time to allow these two most recent draft classes to develop before we can start opening the champagne, but it does seem as though teams are getting better at drafting.
This doesn’t necessarily mean they are better at analyzing individual prospects, but have started to take historical data into account when it comes to targeting certain positions at different points in the first round and in the draft in general. Of course, with a data set this small, there is a chance that the next draft class swings wildly back to the other direction, but it does at least seem that this is an area where progress is being made, but what needs to be done to make further improvements, and what does that mean for evaluations?
So What Needs To Change?
Well, the short answer is a lot.
While there are teams that are significantly better than others, the general theme for this data is that the NFL as a whole is still not very good at hitting on draft picks, even first rounders. While I could hypothesize about exactly why each draft pick fails, there are some general trends in this data that I try and incorporate into my analysis when I’m evaluating prospects.
As you can see, there are far fewer excellent players than very good players, and far fewer very-good players than good players.
Based on the data given above, the number of players who reach the standard of being good NFL players – from the first round anyway – is in the order of 5-15 depending on the draft class, and while it should be expected that this number will be higher due to players reaching this value being selected later in the draft, the number of good prospects is probably only on the order of 15-30 in any given draft class, with even fewer than that hitting the heights of being franchise cornerstones.
I look to incorporate these numbers into my evaluations – I tend to value potential value less than some other evaluators.
This isn’t a direct takeaway from the data given above, but rather an extrapolation that if far fewer players than expected reach the level of being competent NFL players, prospects who are already at that level are more valuable than those who are not but who might have higher ceilings. This doesn’t mean that I don’t take potential value into account when evaluating players, or that players who have this aren’t worth selecting high in the draft, but that if all a player offers is potential, the data suggests that the frequency that potential gets realized is far lower than teams seem to believe.
In other words, teams seem to think they are far better at developing players than the data suggests they are.
I have already recently discussed the details of how I go about evaluating prospects – while, in general, watching tape is watching tape, even if you look for slightly different things, when it comes to transferring qualitative opinions into even semi-quantitative grades, it is important that these grades are based on realistic outcome probabilities. There is still an awful lot of work to be done in terms of trying to quantify the development probabilities for different positions, college background and skill set deficiencies; this is likely to be something that teams continue to look to their analytics departments to try and build upon – at even the most basic level of inspection, it is clear that successfully evaluating draft prospects is something that is really very difficult.
This is a problem without any easy answers, but while scouting still has to continue to be driven by qualitative player analysis, using data to guide that analysis is something that all teams and independent evaluators should be looking to do. It’s not yet clear how the Panthers’ ever-expanding analytics department is going to be used, but delving deeper into areas such as those covered here would be a pretty good starting point.